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Abstract 
Ricardian equivalence is a topic which has attracted much attention in the 
economic journals in the past couple of decades. Economic theory states that a tax cut 
gives the public a greater disposable income. Thus, the public will consume more, and 
the economy will grow. However, if the tax cut is fmanced by debt, the public will 
perceive that a future tax increase is inevitable to pay off the debt. Under this scenario, 
the public will not consume more. Instead, they will save all of their increased 
disposable income in anticipation of thefuture tax increase. Ricardian equivalence then 
is that the value of the tax cut is equal to the present value of the future tax increase. 
This paper tests Ricardian equivalence within the context of the Patinkin 
framework, using a single reduced-form equation. A regression analysis is performed 
on the interest rate using real GNP, real tax receipts, additional real public debt, the 
change in the price level, real government expenditures, and real money supply. This 
study fmds that the data used for the time period 1975: 1 to 1991 :4 are consistent with 
that of Ricardian equivalence. 
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Ricardian Equivalence or the Indifference Between Tax and Debt Financing 
By Chad Moutray 
I. Introduction 
As the Federal government continues to finance its operations more and more 
through debt, many economists have focused their attention on the effects of running 
deficits on economic activity. This has led many to take a long-term approach to 
analyzing what we are doing to future generations in this country. Many agree that by 
continuing our policy of borrowing to maintain our current standard of living we are 
mortgaging the futures of our children. But as this debate looms, another one stirs in 
the background; some economists believe that attempts to stimulate the economy 
through fiscal policy (such as the tax cuts that we experienced in the early 1980's) are 
in vain. The concept of a Ricardian equivalence is one that numerous journal articles 
have discussed in recent years. This paper will introduce the idea of Ricardian 
equivalence and attempt to prove or disprove its existence in the context of the Patinkin 
model. 
It is important to first begin with the traditional view of how fiscal policy can 
stimulate the economy before going into the more complex issue of Ricardian 
equivalence. A measure of economic activity in a given country is the gross national 
· product, or GNP. The GNP is the sum of personal consumption, private investment, 
government expenditures, and net exports. Thus, it is easy to show that an increase in 
government expenditures will increase GNP and, therefore, the nation's income. A tax 
cut, on the other hand, can stimulate the economy by putting more money in the hands 
of the consumer (a higher level of disposable income); thus, a tax cut can also raise 
GNP. 
The above textbook illustration of fiscal stimulus is widely accepted and taught 
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in principles of economics courses, but differences arise when that fiscal stimulus, a tax 
cut perhaps, is financed by debt. This is where Ricardian equivalence becomes 
important. The logic is simply that the taxpayer/consumer is smart enough to know 
that a tax cut which is underwritten by borrowing today will have to be paid off at some 
later date. Thus, fiscal stimulus today will have to be met with a fiscal contraction down 
the road. Since the consumer will see the increase in his disposable income as only 
temporary, or "transitory," he will not increase his consumption as expected under the 
traditional view. Consequently, he will save his transitory income in expectation of the 
future contraction, a tax increase perhaps. The Ricardian equivalence implies then that 
the value of the tax cut equals the present value of the future tax increase. In addition, 
Gertrud M. Fremling and John R. Lott, Jr. (1989) argue that Ricardian behavior 
prompts the consumer not only to save up for the expected future tax increases but also 
to compensate for future deadweight loss increases which are caused by the tax 
mcreases. 
This paper will first introduce a survey of current literature on Ricardian 
equivalence in section II. From there, section III will initially introduce the Patinkin 
model and then set up a model that will be tested in this paper. Empirical results will 
appear in section IV. Once the fmdings have been stated, their implications will be 
discussed in section V, and then suggestions for further research will end the paper with 
section VI. 
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II. A Survey of the Literature 
Robert J. Barro, an economics professor at Harvard, fueled the current 
discussion on Ricardian equivalence. In the November/December 1974 issue of the 
Joumal of Political Economy, Barro surfaced the concept in his article, "Aie 
Government Bonds Net Wealth?" He states that consumers behave as if "they were 
infinitely lived," and thus, as long as "an operative chain of intergenerational transfers 
which connected current to future generations" exists, then government bonds would 
produce neutral effects (p. 1116). He then goes on to say: 
"The basic conclusion is that there is no persuasive theoretical case for 
treating government debt, at the margin, as a net component of perceived 
household wealth. The argument for a negative wealth effect seems, a 
priori, to be as convincing as the argument for a positive effect. Hence, 
the common assertion (as in Patink.in 1962, chap. 12, p. 289) that the 
marginal net-wealth effect of government bonds is somewhere between 
zero and one and is most likely to lie at some positive intermediate value 
that has no a priori foundation. If, in fact, the marginal net-wealth effect 
were negligible, the implications for monetary and fiscal analysis would 
be far-reaching" (p. 1116). 
Since then, a number of prominent economists have entered the arena to either support 
or denounce the Ricardian equivalence. 
Paul Evans agrees wit~ Barro that government debt is neutral. He formulates 
a linear equation for the expected steady-state interest rate. Then by fmding the values 
of the parameters, debt neutrality can be tested. Evans writes in his 1989 article, 
"A linear version of the model under consideration is: 
where r·t, d•t' and g•t are, respectively, the expected steady-state real 
interest rate, and the expected steady-state ratios of the government debt 
and government spending to output; the expectations are those of bond 
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traders during period t; f3 d and P 8 are parameters; and ut is an error term . 
. . . If government debt is neutral, then Pd=O and P8=0; if government 
wealth is net wealth, then Pd>O and P8>0" (1989, p. 41). 
His paper concludes that Pd<O (increasing the Federal debt lowers the interest rate); 
therefore, government-debt neutrality is then assumed since the value of the parameter 
is negative. 
According to :8. Douglas Bernheim., a critic of Ricardian equivalence, there are 
seven assumptions that must be made in order for it to be valid. He writes: 
"These include: 1) successive generations are linked by altruistically 
motivated transfers; 2) capital markets are either perfect, or fail in 
specific ways; 3) consumers are rational and farsighted; 4) the 
postponement of taxes does not redistribute resources across families 
with systematically different marginal propensities to consume; 5) taxes 
are non-distortionary; 6) the use of deficits cannot create value (not even 
through bubbles); and 7) the availability of deficit financing as a fiscal 
instrument does not alter the political process" (1989, p. 63). 
Of these assumptions, it would be easy to find fault with some of them. Like the ideal 
situations of perfect competition, though, Ricardian equivalence is only expected to 
approximate reality. Thus, the suggestion that consumers are "rational and farsighted" 
is not necessarily a fatal flaw. 
What Bernheim feels is the most troubling about the Ricardian equivalence 
theorem is the concept of altruistically-motivated intergenerational transfers, or 
bequests. For an explanation of why these become relevant. it is necessary to quote 
Robert J. Barro: 
"Consider a deficit-fmanced tax cut, and assume that the higher future 
taxes occur partly during the typical person's lifetime and partly 
thereafter. Then the present value of the first portion must fall short of 
the initial tax cut, since a full balance results only if the second portion 
is included. Hence the net wealth of persons alive rises, and household 
react by increasing consumption demand. Thus. as in the standard 
approach sketched above, desired private saving does not rise by enough 
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to offset fully the decline in government saving" (1989, p. 40). 
Barro then goes on to suggest that the results depend on whether or not "the typical 
person feels better off when the government shifts a tax burden to his or her 
descendants" or "is already giving to his or her children out of altruism" (p. 40). In 
arguing in support of bequests as a method for maintaining Ricardian equivalence, 
Barro notes that these transfers do not have to be upon death only; they can also be in 
the form of gifts given during the lifetime or even paying for their child's education (p. 
41). But Martin Feldstein disagrees with the notion that "such in-kind transfers" have 
similar effects as bequests since they involve additional spending. Thus, "a taX 
reduction can increase current consumer spending [via these in-kind transfers]" (1982, 
p. 5), a clear violation of Ricardian equivalence. 
For his part, Bernheim disagrees with the assumptions made by Barro. First of 
all, he states that, "Due to the linkages between families, it is in general impossible to 
represent any particular family (or set of families) as a single, utility-maximizing agent, 
even when the well-being of each individual is assumed to depend only on his own 
consumption and well-being of his children" (1989, p. 64). The next problem with this 
line of reasoning is that transfers mainly occur among the very rich; although, some do 
occur in other socioeconomic classes. In fact, Bernheim writes, "Finally, several authors 
(e.g. Diamond and Hausman, 1984) have found that roughly 20 percent of the 
population arrives at retirement with essentially no bequeathable assets. Other evidence 
indicates that the receipt of gifts from children is relatively uncommon (Hurd, 1987b )" 
(p. 66-7). In addition, it is also possible for a transfer to be negative, according to 
Martin Feldstein; "A parent who believes that, because of generally rising productivity 
and real incomes, his children will be richer than him.self, may well decide that the 
optimal 'bequest' is negative, i.e., a transfer from his children to himseJr' ( 1982, p. 5). 
Bernheim's third reason is that some bequests are accidental (due to an untimely death) 
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and others might have "alternative motivations;" these could interfere with Barro's 
assumptions and alter the results (p. 67). Finally, Bernheim. argues that not all bequests 
are born out of altruism; instead, a strategic bequest motive is used so that the parent 
can influence the child's behavior. Thus, a "credible threat" by the parent can result in 
leaving a larger transfer to a well-behaved child. 
Other author~ have also dealt with the intergenerational transfer area. James 
Andreoni developed an impure altruism model in which individuals receive a "warm 
glow" from giving to others. His model treats consumption as a public good. For 
parents giving to their children, he says that "Parents are taken as altruistic: they care 
about their own consumption, xP, and the consumption of th~ir heir, xh. Since the heir 
also cares about Xii, it is a public good" (1989, p. 1456). He then proceeds to develop the 
utility functions of the two, which are: 
UP = UP (xP, xh, b) where b = bequests 
uh= uh (xJ 
In maximizing each one's utility, it is important to note that: 
"Parents are impurely altruistic with respect to their gifts to heirs, while 
the heirs can be thought of as 'purely altruistic' with their own 
consumption. As such, redistributions from children (more altruistic) to 
parents (less altruistic) will reduce the private supply of the public good 
(the consumption of the heir). Parents will be unwilling to perfectly 
substitute bequests for debt; hence they will keep some of their new 
'wealth' for themselves" (p. 1456). 
A similar result will occur if instead of the parents leaving a bequeath to the child. the 
child is giving (gifts) to the parent; thereby, the consumption of the parent is the public 
good. It, too, creates a result which is non-neutral and conflicts with Ricardian 
equivalence. In a paper by Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Assaf Razin, and Robert W. 
Rosenthal, they explore this possibility that both the parent and the child are altruistic. 
"Barro does not make explicit the game he models between an altruistic 
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parent and child, but in his formulation the child appear to be quite 
passive and simply takes whatever transfer is given. There is no scope for 
the child to manipulate the parent by threatening to refuse transfers that 
are below a specified level and/or by threatening to the parent if the 
parent is not sufficiently generous" (p. 1261). 
By maximizing the utility functions of both the parent and the child, these authors reach 
a similar conclusion that government policy is non-neutral and does increase 
consumption. 
Turning away from altruistic transfers, another area of disagreement is that the 
uncertainty over future income and taxes can lead to problems with Ricardian 
equivalence. Martin Feldstein, for instance, has argued that when there is uncertainty, 
Ricardian equivalence fails (1988, p. 22). However, William A. Bomberger responded 
to Feldstein by saying that introducing uncertainty into the model only complicates the 
process "unnecessarily" and that uncertainty does not really cause the theory to fail 
(1990, p. 312). Furthermore, it should be mentioned that when progressive taxes are 
introduced into the model instead of lump sum, many economists (for example, Kimball 
and Mank.iw 1989) have found that the overall result is somewhat altered. For his 
part, Barro argues that taxes are "smoothed out" over time and has found in his studies 
that the budget deficits between 1916 and 1983 can be explained in this way. To 
illustrate, he writes: 
"For example, if time periods are identical except for the quantity of 
government purchases - which are assumed not to interact directly with 
labor supply decisions -- optimality dictates uniform taxation of labor 
income over time. This constancy of tax rates requires budget deficits 
when government spending is unusually high. such as in wartime, and -
surpluses when spending is unusually low" (1989, p. 46). 
Thus. due to this smoothing-out effect. Barro suggests that the uncertainty over taxes 
and the timing of taxes will not affect the economy in a way that would unravel the 
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Ricardian equivalence theorem due to the fact that tax rates are constant over time. 
Miles S. Kimball and N. Gregory Mankiw, however, argue that while consumption 
would have little impact in the short-run from a "tax rescheduling," long-term 
repayment can significantly alter consumption, disproving Ricardian equivalence (1989, 
p. 871-3). 
The recent wave of journal articles has produced a number of empirical articles 
on the subject of various effects of Ricardian equivalence on consumption. 
Nonetheless, they have been rather inconclusive. For instance, Paul Evans ran 
"instrumental variable regressions of consumption on lagged consumption and lagged 
assets" over several sample periods. He found that tax cuts, including the Reagan tax 
cut, did not appear to increase the level of consumption and upheld Ricardian 
equivalence (1988). Similarly, James S. Fackler and W. Douglas McMillin looked at 
the effects of government debt on the economy from 1963:2 through 1984:4. Using a 
VAR methodology, they were able to improve the "robustness" of their results and 
found that "the sum of domestically-held and foreign-held debt had non-trivial effects 
on the long-term interest rate and output" (1989, p. 1002). But, the "impulse response 
functions" show that the initial reaction is actually lm£g interest rates, output, and 
prices. This could be explained by Roger C. Kormendi as individuals saving "more than 
the present value of income streams" due to uncertainty over future taxes. This is not 
consistent with the traditional thinking, and thus suggests that Ricardian equivalence 
might be at work. Nevertheless, Bernheim argues that the differences in the many 
articles can be traced to varying the null hypothesis and that there is a definite pro-
Ricardian bias in the studies. He also states the need to look at permanent deficits, 
instead of transitory. "Both Bernheim and [Bradford G.] Reid found that permanent 
deficits significantly raise consumption as a fraction of national income. These results 
are consistent with the Neoclassical paradigm" (1989, p. 69). 
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In a study by David Wilcox, the effects of unexpected policy changes on 
consumption behavior are analyzed using the life~ycle hypothesis. According to the 
theory, all known policy changes have already been included in an individual's level of 
consumption. Unexpected modifications in policies will not alter consumption unless 
the change is interpreted to be permanent; transitory changes will not have an effect on 
consumption (1989, p. 289). In the article he uses Social Security benefit increases, 
which are assumed to be expected because they are revealed in advance, and the timing 
of their announcement to analyze their effects on consumption patterns. His 
conclusions are that these raises result in large consumption increases, especially for 
durable goods. This is true for a large number of observations and is "shown to be a 
regular feature of the post-1965 data" (p. 303). This also helps to cast a shadow of 
doubt on Ricardian equivalence because the Social Security increases tended to raise 
aggregate demand. 
Time-series regressions have also been used to test Ricardian equivalence. 
Nicholas Sarantis tested data for Belgium, Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom for 1960 to 1980. He tested 
them one by one and as a group and found that fiscal variables had an impact on 
consumer spending; the results were even stronger when the nine countries were tested 
together. Sarantis therefore concludes that his findings are "consistent with the more 
general view that changes in government expenditure, transfers, and taxes can exert 
substantial effects on aggregate demand" (1985, p. 245). Holcombe, Jackson, and 
Zardhoohi tested the impact of government debt on per capita personal savings for the 
United States from 1929 to 1976. Their findings were that for every dollar of additional 
debt, 20 cents of it would be saved~ the other 80 cents would be passed on as a future 
burden ( 1981 ). 
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ID. The Model 
Having introduced the literature that is relevant to this paper, it is now time to 
develop a model testing the Ricardian equivalence thereom. While reading the many 
articles on this subject, I was still daunted by the fact that during the 1980's debt 
accumulated at record proportions. Even Barro, who advanced the tax-smoothing 
concept mentioned before, added the disclaimer, "although the deficits since 1984 tum 
out to be substantially higher than predicted" (1989, p. 47). We have watched as 
government debt at all levels, corporate and business debt, and individual debt have 
skyrocketed over the past few decades. Indeed, many economists blame the current 
sluggishness of the economy on the fact that we are now paying off some of our debt 
(with the notable exception of government). Indeed, Paul Evans found that the Reagan 
tax cuts did not affect consumption. But to the naked eye, something did happen to 
consumption in the 1980's. Figure 1 shows private consumption adjusted for inflation 
using 1980 as the base year and the Federal government deficit for each quarter 1970: 1 
through 1991:2. Notice that consumption departs from its trend around 1983; 
meanwhile, the deficit continues to become larger. Figure 3 shows the "marginal tax 
burden" (or the Federal tax plus the FICA tax rate) for these same years; notice that the 
tax burden begins to fall drastically around 1982-83. Was it just a coincidence that the 
growth in real consumption steadily increased as tax rates fell? Notice also that Figure 
4 shows the yield on long-term U.S. Bonds; the yields have also dropped since their peak 
in 1981-82. The examination of these statistics might lead to the premature assumption 
that Ricardian equivalence has not held up during the last twenty plus years, but these 
statistics alone do not prove anything. So the next step is to come up with a 
macroeconomic model which can be used to test Ricardian equivalence. 
To begin with, I will introduce the work of T. Windsor Fields and William R. 
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Hart. Their 1990 article in Economic Inquiry was essentially a "teaching tool" so that 
professors would be able to teach Ricardian equivalence to undergraduates using the 
IS-LM framework. They began with the basic IS and LM equations, but disposable 
income is redefined to reflect the reality that consumers would view an increase in bond-
financed government expenditures as a future increase in taxes. Therefore, they use the 
following equation: 
(1) Y = C(Y-G) + I(R) + G 
This is the standard identity that GNP equals consumption plus investment plus 
government expenditures. In this equation, national income, or gross national product, 
is denoted as a Y. Government expenditures are G, and the interest rate is an R. 
Consumption is defmed as a C and is a function of disposable income (using 
government expenditures instead of taxes), and investment is a function of the interest 
rate. Now, since taxes are no longer a consideration in the model, a tax cut fmanced by 
bonds will have no effect on consumption. Their LM equation does not need to change 
for Ricardian equivalence to hold, according to the two authors. 
Before proceding further, it is important to introduce the Patinkin model. This 
model has four assumptions. First, there is full employment in the labor market; thus, 
labor supply equals labor demand. Second, there is no money illusion; consumers and 
workers are aware of the effects of inflation on prices and wages. Next, the marginal 
propensity to consume does not change with income. Finally, no one expects any 
inflation in the future. 
Under this scenario, there are four markets. The first, which was mentioned 
earlier, is µie labor market. Equilibrium in the labor market, written in the form of 
labor demand equals labor supply, would appear as follows: 
(2) Y(W/P, KJ = R(W/P) 
The real wage is denoted as nominal wage, or W, over the price level, or P, and Ko 
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denotes the capital stock. The real wage has a negative effect on labor demand and a 
positive one on labor supply. The more capital that is used in the process, the more 
productive labor; thus, it has a positive impact on labor demand. The first assumption 
of the Patinkin model is full employment, and this equation satisfies it. The next market 
is the commodity market; in equilibrium, it is written as: 
(3) F(Y0, R, MJP) = S(W/P, KJ = Y0 
Y0 is the commodity supply (it is equal to S(W/P, KJ because of the full employment 
assumption). The nominal money supply is denoted with an M0; the interest rate is R. 
Fis the commodity demand function, and Sis the commodity supply function. Income 
and the real money supply have a positive effect on the commodity demand; whereas, 
higher interest rates lower commodity demand. The bond market is the third. In 
equilibrium, it appears as follows: 
(4) 
Nominal money balances held by households are denoted as Mo HH' and MoF indicates 
money held by firms. The price of a bond is l!R. Income has a positive impact on both 
bond demand and supply; the price of the bond positively influences bond supply but 
negatively affects oond demand. The more money held by households, the greater the 
bond demand; but, the more money held by firms, the lower the bond supply. The final 
market is the money market, which in equilibrium is written as follows: 
( 5) MJP = L(Y 0, R, MJP) 
Income and real money balances have a positive effect on the demand for real money 
balances; while, the interest rate negatively impacts it. 
Having introduced the four markets, it is important to state that the labor 
market can be left out for our purposes because of the full employment assumption, 
assumes flexible prices and nominal wages, i.e., real wages will always adjust to ensure 
full employment. Moreover, because ofWalras' Law (which asserts that if two markets 
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are in equilibrium, then the third one is as well), only the commodity and money 
markets will be used for analysis. The two markets in equilibrium can be represented 
by a CC and an LL curve. The CC curve represents combinations of Rand P such that 
the commodity market is in equilibrium. On the other hand, the LL curve shows 
combinations of Rand P such that the money market is in equilibrium. Where these 
two curves cross (CC has a negative slope and BB a positive slope) is considered a 
general equilibrium for the four markets (the labor market is always in equilibrium and 
the bond market is because ofWalras' Law). 
When .incorporating the government sector, the standard Patinkin model takes 
the following form for the CC and the LL curves: 
(6) Y = F(Y-T, R, MJP +kV/RP)+ G 
(7) MJP = L(Y-T, R, Mp+ kV/RP) 
In these equations, Y is defined as income (or output), and, therefore, since T denotes 
taxes, Y-T is disposable income. The interest rate is R; government spending is G. The 
wealth effect is subdivided into two parts. The first, MJP, is the real value of money 
holdings, and the second, kV /RP, is the real value of bond holdings. The k value is 
what was described earlier in the paper in a quotation by Barro as the marginal net 
wealth effect. If k=O, Ricardian equivalence will hold because everyone is concerned 
about future taxes; if k=l, no one is concerned about future taxes. If the disposable 
income component is changed to Y-G, as Fields and Hart have used when integrating 
Ricardian equivalence in the context of the IS-LM model, then the new CC and LL 
curves would appear as: 
(8) Y = (Y-G, R, MJP +kV/RP)+ G 
(9) MJP = (Y-G, R, MJP +kV/RP) 
Trying to differentiate and solve these equations to fmd the change in output with 
respect to a change in fiscal policy is quite horrendous, especially since the fmal result 
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is inconclusive due to the fact that the value of k is unknown. Ifk=O, though, then the 
change in output would exactly equal the change in government expenditures ( dy=dg). 
But if k>O, then the output change will more than likely outstrip the change in 
government expenditures ( dy>dg) and Ricardian equivalence will not hold. 
The next step is to specify an aggregate supply function. In this model the 
commodity supply is a function of the price difference in two consecutive time periods. 
The total commodity demand, like the Patinkin model, consists of a private component 
which is a function of disposable income, the interest rate, the wealth effect (real money 
balances), and a public component, namely, government expenditures. In this case the 
private commodity function is assumed to be loglinear. The two equations then appear 
as follows: 
(10) Y = C0 + C1 (Pt - Pi,.1) 
(11) y1 =Ao + A1 log(Y" - T) + Ai log R + A:i log(M/P) + G 
Before going on, it is necessary to state that y• and yd denote commodity supply and 
demand respectively, Pt is the current price, Pt.tis last year's price, Tis tax revenues, R 
is the interest rate, and G is government spending. Ao through ~ are coefficients. If 
commodity supply equals commodity demand, then the equilibrium condition is: 
Solving for the log of disposable income, one obtains: 
(13) log(Y' - n =(Co - AJIA1 + (C/A1) (P - Pl) - (AJA1) log r - CA:i/Al) log(M/P) -
-(l/A1) G 
It is necessary now to derive the condition for money market equilibrium. In this 
model the money supply is exogenous, and money demand is a function of disposable 
income, the interest rate, and the wealth effect. Then the equations for money supply 
and money demand are as follows: 
(14) M•;p = M/P 
(15) Md/P = B0 + B1 log(Y' -T) + B2 log R + B3 log(M/P) 
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where M1/P and Md/P are real money supply and real money demand, respectively. 
Disposable income is defined as Y'-T, where Y' is commodity supply and Tis tax 
revenues. The interest rate is again denoted as R, and the real money balances are 
MJP. B0 through B3 are coefficients. If real money supply equals real money demand, 
then the equilibrium condition can be written as: 
(16) MofP = B0 + B1 log(Y' -1) + B2 log R + B3 log(MofP) 
Once we have arrived at equations for both the commodity and money market 
equilibrium, a reduced-form equation is desired so that it can be estimated using single-
equation regression analysis. Thus, by taking equation (13) and solving it for the log 
of the real money supply, we arrive at: 
(17) log(MJP) = (C0 - ~)/A3 + (C/AJ (Pt -Pt-1) -(A/~) log R-(1/AJ G-
- (Aif AJ log(Y' -1) 
This can then be substituted into equation (16). The result is: 
(18) MJP = B0 + B1 log(Y' -1) + B2 log R + (B/A3) (C0 -Ao) + (C1B/AJ (Pt - P tri) -
-(A2B/AJ log R-(B/A3) G-(A1B/A3) log(Y' -n 
If this equation is solved for the log of the interest rate, then: 
(19) (A)l/~ -BJ log R = B0 + (B/A..J (C0 -AJ + (B1 -A1B/AJ log(Y' -1) + 
+ (C1B/~) (Pt -Pt-1) -(B/AJ G-MJP 
This can be rewritten in terms of just log r. For simplicity, though, I have renamed the 
coefficients ko through k4 to eliminate needless clutter. 
(20) log R = ko + k1 log(Y' -1) +~(Pt -Pt-1) - ls G-k4 (M/P) 
This is the equation that can now be estimated. 
Equation (20) is important because it describes disposable income impacting the 
interest rate. The previous calculations used the definition of y• - T for disposable 
income. But if Ricardian equivalence truly holds and bond financing instead of tax 
financing is used, then disposable income could easily be restated as Y' - B (where B 
denotes the real value of government bonds, or debt financing). Thus equation (20) can 
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be rewritten as follows: 
(21) log R = ko + k1 log(Y - B) + .lei (Pt - P i-J -k3 G - k4 (MJP) 
These two equations can be estimated separately and their coefficients estimated. If the 
value of k1 in equation (20) equals the value of k1 in equation (21 ), then it would suggest 
that tax and bond financing have similar effects on the interest rate. Thus, it would help 
to confirm Ricardian equivalence. 
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IV. The Empirical Results 
The two statistical models that are tested look like the following: 
(22) log INT= f(log(Y -TAX), Pt -Pt-1, GOVT, M2) and 
(23) log INT= g(log(Y - DEBT), Pt - Pt-1, GOVT, M2) 
where INT = the 3-month T-bill yield rate, in percent 
Y =real gross national product, in billions of 1982-4 dollars 
T.A~X =real Federal tax receipts, in billions of 1982-4 dollars 
DEBT= the change in real public debt, in billions of 1982-4 dollars 
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P =the ,price deflator, where 1982-4 is the base; P1 is P lagged one penod 
GOVT = real government outlays, in billions of 1982-4 dollars 
M2 = real M2, in billions of 1982-4 dollars 
These two testable equations are derived from equations (20) and (21) of the previous 
section. For adjusting each nominal variable into a real value, the consumer price index 
using 1982-4 as the base period is used. In this case data has been collected quarterly 
from 1975:1to1991:4. 
A closer look at the variables is needed to provide a clue of what to expect in the 
regression results. For the interest rate, the 3-mon th T-bill yield rate is used in this case. 
This data can easily be found in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
For income the obvious choice is the GNP. But initially, personal income was 
used in the preliminary regressions. The reason is that I wanted to test these equations 
using both monthly and quarterly data (monthly was from January 1986 on); however, 
gross national product figures are only calculated on a quarterly basis. Therefore, for 
consistency between the monthly and quarterly results, personal income was used. But 
the monthly results proved to be extremely unreliable by producing multiple 
insignificant variables, a low R 2 and F value, and a host of other problems. So only 
quarterly results will be used in this paper. Thus, gross national product can be used. 
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This data can be found in International Financial Statistics. 
The Survey of Current Business lists the data for tax revenues, government 
outlays, and the price index. This data can easily be found. For government finance 
figures, they are outlined in the form of government receipts and outlays and are 
reported in millions of dollars. The urban consumer price index is the one used for this 
study. In order to achieve the data for the whole period, however, some 1967= I 00 data 
had to be recalculated so that the common base period is 1982-4. 
Debt figures can be found in the Treasury BuUetin under the heading "Total 
Public Debt Securities." These numbers are listed in millions of dollars on a monthly 
basis. To arrive at my data, the change in the quarterly averages provides the 
information on the change in the amount of debt from quarter to quarter. 
The final data set is for M2. M2 is defined as the sum of all currency 
outstanding, checking accounts, outstanding travelers' checks, small (under $100,000) 
savings deposits, and small time deposits (Henderson 817). This is readily available in 
the Federal Reserve BuUetin. However, in early 1980 the definition of the monetary 
aggregates was redefined. This provides a problem with obtaining pre-1980 M2 figures. 
I was unable to find M2 data prior to February 1979 in my search that fit the "new M2" 
redefinition. I did, however, find an article in the Federal Reserve BuUetin, "The 
Redefined Monetary Aggregates" by Thomas D. Simpson, which listed the growth rates 
of the "new M2" from 1973 to 1979. Using these growth rates, I was then able to 
approximate the M2 data from 1975: I to 1979: 1. I realize that there is room for 
rounding error, but hopefully, that is minimal. 
The upper half of Table I presents the results of running the two models 
explained above. Reported in the table are the parameter estimates for each 
independent variable, the t-statistic for each variable, the adjusted R 2 for the model, the 
F-value for the models, and the Durbin-Watson test statistic. To begin with, it is 
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Table 1 
Re2ressjon Analysis on the Loa of the Interest Rate. 1975:1 to 1991:4 
Estimated Coefficients for Goodness of Fit 
the Independent Variables Determinants 
Inter. log(Y-TAX) log(Y-DEBT) P-P1 GOVT M2 Adj. R2 F-val. D-W 
-42.93 6.49 
(-6.338)* (6.729)* 
-46.29 
(-7.066)* 
-18.14 3.51 
(-3.186)* (3.564)* 
-22.57 
(-3.285)* 
-Before correcting for autocorrelation 
6.93 
(7.471)* 
13.38 0.000002 -0.004 0.7096 41.310 0.538 
(3.569)* (0.982) (-9.157)* 
8.41 0.000002 -0.004 0.7355 46.884 0.519 
(2.168) (1.565) (-9.922)* 
After correcting for autocorrelation 
4.24 
(3.577)* 
32.52 
(3.354)* 
32.09 
(2.883)* 
-0.009 0.3693 13.294 1.863 
(-4.587)* 
-0.010 0.3519 12.403 2.047 
(-4.383)* 
Values in the parentheses arc absolute t values. 
• denotes I percent level of significance 
+ denotes 5 percent level of significance 
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meaningful to notice how similar the results of these two regressions are. The coefficient 
estimates are comparable for each of the independent variables, including the two 
definitions of disposable income. Despite the fact that what is needed is for the 
disposable income parameters to be equal, the fact that all of the parameters are just 
about equal disturbs me. The reason is that the correlation coefficient between the data 
for Y-T AX and the data for Y-D EBT is 0.97227. Therefore, the resemblance between 
the two regression could very well be caused by the fact that the two data sets (which 
is the only difference between the two anyway) are analogous. 
To evaluate the overall models, the F-test is used. This is done by setting the 
alternative of a good model where at least one of the betas does not equal zero against 
the null hypothesis of a bad model where ~ 1=f32=f3 3=f3 4=0. Using the SAS printout, F-
values of 41.310 and 46.884 have been reported. The cutoff points using 4 numerator 
and 62 denominator degrees of freedom equals approximately 2.50 at an alpha level of 
5 percent. Therefore, since both F-values are greater than 2.50, the null hypothesis can 
be rejected. Or, in other words, with a five percent chance for error, it can be concluded 
that the log of the interest rate is impacted by at least one of the independent variables. 
These models have adjusted R 2 values of 0. 7096 and 0. 7355. Therefore, about 
70.96 percent and 73.55 percent of the change in the log of the interest rate can be 
explained by its linear association with the log of real disposable income, the change in 
price, real government expenditures, and real M2. This takes into account the number 
of independent variables for a more accurate portrayal of the explanatory power of the 
model. 
Therefore, the overall model is significant. The F-value is high, and the 
explanatory power is also impressive, but despite that, the two regressions have other 
problems. The first and more serious problem is that of autocorrelation. The Durbin-
Watson for each of them is very low. The second problem is the fact that the variable 
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for real government expenditures is not significant in both models. In addition, 
govenment expenditures are strongly correlated with both the real money supply (a 
correlation coefficient of 0.89992) and disposable income (for Y-TAX, 0.92762). 
Disposable income and the money supply are also highly correlated with a coefficient 
of 0.97376 for Y-TAX and 0.91411 for Y-DEBT; thus multicollinearity is suspected. 
The lower half of Table 1 presents the results of the regression once first-order 
autocorrelation is corrected for and government expenditures dropped from the model 
because of its insignificance and high correlation with the other independent variables. 
Notice again that there are similarities between the two regressions. This could very 
well signify that the strong correlation between the disposable income variables damages 
the credibility of the differences between the two regressions. 
Of course, the reason for the strong relationships between Y -TAX and Y-D EBT 
revolves around the fact that gross national product is the largest part of both of them. 
While tax revenues exceed additional debt period after period, it is not enough to negate 
the fact that both of them are minute compared to GNP. Thus, each measure of 
disposable income has the same trend. 
Another problem with the specification of this model is the fact that during the 
period under study both tax and debt financing occur. In reality, furthermore, it would 
be hard to find a period in our recent history when this country did not engage in both 
tax and debt financing. That is important because both equations (20) and (21) assume 
either just tax financing or just debt financing, respectively. The proper specification 
then would need to be: 
(24) log R = ko + k1 log(¥ -T - B) + kz (Pt -P1,.i) - ls G - k4 MJP 
This reflects the fact that, as Ricardian equivalence stipulates, tax and bond financing 
are both viewed the same way by the consumer; therefore, if there is both, then both 
would be subtracted from income to arrive at disposable income. However, as nice and 
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neat as this is, there are no testable implications for it as far as whether or not tax and 
bond financing are perceived similarly. 
Therefore, adapting equation (24), it is possible to specify a new model which 
includes both tax and bond financing at the same time. This new model would look like 
this: 
(25) INT= h(Y, TAX, DEBT, P-P1' GOVT, MJP) 
Unlike the previous ones, this is linear. Moreover, because of the fact that it is a single 
equation with both real tax revenues and additional real debt as independent variables, 
it is possible to test for equivalence of the parameters of the two. This is a much simpler 
process than before and, hopefully, more fruitful. 
The results of this OLS regression are shown in Table 2. Reported in the table 
are the parameter estimates for each independent variable, the !-statistic for each 
variable, the adjusted R2 for the model, the F-value for the models, and the Durbin-
Watson test statistic. Because SAS is used, it is possible to test for the equivalence of 
the coefficients. In this case it is necessary to know whether or not tax financing equals 
debt financing. This is done by fomulating the null hypothesis that ~2=j3 3 , where ~2 and 
~3 are the coefficients for TAX and DEBT, respectively. For this regression, the F-value 
is 2.9262. Therefore, we can accept the null hypothesis at a significance level of five 
percent (the probability value of the test is 0.0923) that tax financing is equivalent to 
debt financing. 
To evaluate the overall model, the F-test is used. This is done by setting the 
alternative of a good model where at least one of the betas does not equal zero against 
the null hypothesis of a good model where ~1=j32=f3 3=~4=~_?=~ 6=0. Using the SAS 
printout, an F-value of22.361 has been reported. The cutoff points using 6numerator 
and 60 denominator degrees of freedom equals 2.25 at an alpha level of 5 percent. 
Therefore, since 22.361 is greater than 2.25, the null hypothesis can be rejected. Or, in 
Table 2 
Re~ession Analysis on the Interest Rate. ·1275: 1 to 1991:4 
Estimated Coefficients for 
the Independent Variables 
Goodness of Fit 
l)eter:ni.i.nants 
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Inter. y TAX l)EBT P-P1 GOVT M2 Adj. R2 F-val. 1)-W 
Before Adjusting for Autocorrelation and Heteroscedasticity 
18.06 0.01 -0.009 -0.04 113.05 0.00006 -0.03 0.6601 22.361 0. 790 
(7.521)*(4.600)*(-0.763) (-2.472)+ (2.737)* (2.546)+ (-7.033)* 
After Adjusting for Second-Order Autocorrelation and Heteroscedasticity 
-0.17 0.009 -0.003 0.003 25.57 2.55 -0.01 0.6640 19.353 1.636 
(-1.490) (1.694) (-0.610) (0.191) (0.692) (0.011) (-1.269) 
-0.17 0.009 -0.003 0.003 28.22 
(-1.623) (2.970)*(-0.680) (0.416) (1.155) 
Values in the parentheses are absolute t values. 
* denotes 1 percent level of significance 
+ denotes 5 percent level of significance 
-0.01 0.6697 22.968 1.635 
(-2.628)+ 
L 
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other words, with a five percent chance for error, it can be concluded that the interest 
rate is impacted by at least one of the independent variables. 
This model has an adjusted R2 of 0.6601. Therefore, about 66 percent of the 
change in the interest rate can be explained by its linear association with the real GNP, 
the real tax receipts, the additional real public debt, the price change, real government 
expenditures, and the real money supply. Plus, this takes into account the number of 
independent variables for a more accurate portrayal of the explanatory power of the 
model. This is a respectable adjusted R 2 value. 
But this regression suffers from several problems. Again, the Durbin-Watson 
test statistic is low. Thus, autocorrelation is present. In addition, there are several 
instances of strong correlation between the independent variables; hence, 
multicollinearity occurs. For example, the five worst cases are: between income and the 
money supply, the correlation coefficient is 0.97471; 0.71303 for income and tax; 
0.92720 for income and government; 0.89992 for government and the money supply; 
and 0. 74341 for government and debt. Notice again that the government independent 
variable is the main source of the worst correlation. The other problem is 
heteroscedasticity, i.e., the error terms do not have the same variance. By testing the 
null hypothesis that the error terms have the same variance against the hypothesis that 
the error terms depend on the expected values of the dependent variable, we can 
determine if heteroscedasticity is present. To accomplish this, a regression of the 
residuals squared (ei~ on the predicted value must be performed; this is the auxiliary 
regression. The resulting R 2 of this regression, when multiplied by the sample size n, 
follows the x2 distribution with I degree of freedom. The decision rule is to reject the 
null hypothesis ofhomoscedasticity if the calculated x2 exceeds the x2 associated with 
a particular significance level. The calculated x2 (or nR 2, where the auxillary R 2 is used) 
equals 4. 7101, which is greater than 3. 84 (x2 with I degree of freedom and a significance 
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level of five percent). Therefore, unfortunately heteroscedasticity is found. 
The first step to fixing this .regression is to correct for heteroscedasticity. This 
can be done by dividing all of the variables by the predicted value and rerunning the 
regression without an intercept. Instead of the intercept, a new variable, INTER, has 
been created; it is simply the inverse of the predicted value. It simply takes the place of 
the intercept. (For a more detailed discussion of this procedure, see Appendix 1.) 
The next step is to correct for autocorrelation. To correct for first-order 
autocorrelation, the variable is lagged one period and multiplied times the r-value and 
then subtracted from the original variable. The r-value can be found be dividing the. 
Durbin-Watson test statistic by two and subtracting the result from one. For example, 
the interest rate variable can be redefined as follows, using a Durbin-Watson statistic 
of 0.722 (found after correcting for heteroscedacity): 
(26) INT= INTt - (INT~1 * 0.639) 
The other variables are redefined the same way. However, the new Durbin-Watson is 
only 0.851 suggesting that the model suffers from higher-order autocorrelation. 
Therefore, to correct for higher-order autocorrelation, it is necessary to use two 
lags (see Appendix 2). Using the recalculation of the interest rate variable as an example 
again, the computation looks like this: 
(27) INT= INTt - (INTt-1 * 0.639) - (INTt-2 * (0.639}2) 
The new regression results, using this correction technique for higher-order 
autocorrelation after accounting for heteroscedasticity, appear in Table 2. In reference 
to the autocorrelation problem, notice that the Durbin-Watson statistic is much higher 
now. The cutoff points, du and di., for a one percent level of significance are 1.25 and 
1.65 respectfully. Therefore, while technically the test statistic is in the inconclusive 
range, it is close enough to assume that autocorrelation is no longer a problem; the error 
terms are no longer correlated. 
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Multicollinearity occurs when the assumption that the independent variables 
cannot be correlated with one another is violated. The previous runs have suffered from 
this problem, and unfortunately, this model does, too (note that each variable has been 
recalculated to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation). The high F-value 
and adjusted R2 are both indications of a good overall model; however, by looking at 
the Pearson Correlation Coefficients again, high correlation does occur several times. 
These include: a correlation coefficient of 0.99887 between income and M2, 0.81273 
between income and tax receipts, 0.97663 between income and government spending, 
0.80084 between income and additional debt, 0.81018 between tax receipts and M2,. 
0.76583 between tax receipts and government outlays, 0.98033 between government 
spending and M2, 0. 79768 between additional debt and M2, and 0.85144 between 
additional debt and government outlays. In all, there are nine occurrences of strong 
correlation. This is serious enough to consider dropping some variables, but a problem 
arises in eliminating some variables because of their importance in the specification of 
the model. For instance, both tax and debt are insignificant and have strong correlation 
with other independent variables, but deleting them would eliminate the purpose of the 
estimating model. Therefore, the only variable that could possibly be changed without 
respecifying the model would be government spending again. 
After correcting for heteroscedasticity and higher-order autocorrelation and by 
eliminating the government spending variable from the model, the new results can be 
reported. They appear in Table 2. The results are surprisingly similar to the previous 
one, but there are some interesting improvements. The real GNP and M2 variables are 
now significant; whereas, they were not before (real GNP was close). Also, there is a 
2 
slight increase in the explanatory power of the model, or the adjusted R . The 
coefficient estimates, though, are almost the same. 
The SAS printout provides vital information relevant to whether tax financing 
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equals debt financing. It tests for the equivalence of the independent variable's effects 
on the interest rate by examining the equivalence of the two coefficients, in this case 
TAX and DEBT. This test, using 1 numerator and 59 denominator degrees of freedom, 
uses the calculated F-value of 0.8755. Thus, it can be stated that the null hypothesis of 
f3 2=f33 can be accepted. Therefore, tax financing and debt financing have the essentially 
the same effect on the interest rate. That implies that Ricardian equivalence does indeed 
hold. 
Multicollinearity, of course, cannot be corrected by eliminating government from 
the model. In fact, there are still five instances of strong correlation. This means that 
there is little that can be done about it without respecifying the model. 
The calculated x2 (or then times the R 2 of the auxillary regression) equals 0.169, 
which is less than 3.84 with a five percent margin for error. Therefore, this model 
possibly does not have heteroscedasticity. 
The Durbin-Watson test statistic in this model is 1. 63 5. Therefore, using the null 
hypothesis that the error terms are not correlated versus the alternative of positive 
correlation, no autocorrelation can be assumed if the calculated Durbin-Watson is 
greater than the upper bound test statistic (<fu). The du here equals 1.61 at an alpha 
level of one percent; the error terms are not correlated. 
To evaluate the overall model, the F-test is used. This is done by setting the 
alternative of a good model where at least one of the betas does not equal zero against 
the null hypothesis of a good model where ~1=~2=f3 3=f3 4=f3 ?0· Using the SAS printout, 
an F-value of 22.968 has been reported. The cutoff points using 5 numerator and 59 
denominator degrees of freedom equals approximately 2.30 at an alpha level of 5 
percent. Therefore, since 22.968 is greater than 2.30, the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
Or, in other words, with a five percent chance for error, it can be concluded that the 
interest rate is impacted by at least one of the independent variables. 
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This model has an adjusted R 2 of 0. 6697. Therefore, about 66.97 percent of the 
change in the interest rate can be explained by its linear association with the real GNP, 
the real tax receipts, the additional real public debt, the price change, and the real 
money supply. In addition, this measure takes into account the number of independent 
variables for a more accurate portrayal of the explanatory power of the model. 
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V. Implication of the Findings 
This paper has shown that the relationship between the interest rate and real tax 
receipts is similar to the one between the interest rate and additional real public debt. 
The implication then is that the public is much more aware of the fiscal actions of the 
government than perhaps the former is given credit for. The review of literature 
concentrated on the subject of whether or not people are altruistic with respect to the 
additional disposable income received from a tax decrease. There are those who suggest 
that people are unselfish with respect to the tax cut; they will save it for either 
themselves or their heirs in preparation for what they perceive as an inevitable tax 
increase. But there are also others who suggest that people are indeed selfish. They will 
spend their additional disposable income and disregard what they do not perceive as an 
inevitable tax increase; they simply do not think about the future when making 
consumer choices. The fmdings of this paper suggest that people are unselfish. 
This conclusion is even more striking when one considers that the data ranges 
from 1975 through 1991, a period of enormous debt fmancing. Moreover, as mentioned 
before, it was also a period of tremendous growth in consumption; the savings rate fell 
to an all-time low. This would appear to be a convincing period for disproving 
Ricardian equivalence. Yet, in fact, it helps to verify it. 
It is important to note that this study is based on solid theoretical grounds. This 
paper begins with the introduction of the Patinkin model, and involves three 
simultaneous equations. There are the aggregate supply function, the equilibrium 
equation for the commodity market, and the equilibrium equation for the money 
market. These are then solved simultaneously to arrive at a reduced-form equation. 
Using that framework, the Ricardian equivalence thereom could be tested by isolating 
tax and debt fmancing and proving their equivalence. The regressions, despite a few 
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problems, support this theorem. Now, it is possible to state that tax financing has the 
same impact on the interest rate as does debt financing. This is an important 
contribution of this study. 
The acceptance of Ricardian equivalence has an important implication for 
society. What it adds to the picture is simply that our leaders cannot deceive the public 
by using additional debt simply because it is politically unpopular to increase revenues 
by raising taxes. Because tax and debt financing both have essentially the same impact, 
the public will react to additional debt as if it were a tax increase. Therefore, if it is 
politically unpopular to raise taxes, it should also be politically unacceptable to have 
larger and larger public debts. In this peculiar election year, that is becoming more 
evident. The public has become more and more disgusted with wasteful government 
spending. This just could be the time when both tax and debt are controlled 
simultaneously. 
L 
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VI. Suggestions for Further Research 
The ideal situation for testing whether tax and debt fmancing have the same 
impact on the economy would be to find a period that uses one method and then 
another period which uses the other. This would be a much more reliable way of testing 
for the equivalence of the two forms of financing, but since no such time periods exist, 
at least in recent times when data is readily available, that is perhaps not achievable. 
However, it might be possible to use data from other countries. They might be more 
inclined to use one or the other method of fmancing exclusively. Moreover, one of the. 
main problems with this study was the fact that it was time-series~ hence, 
autocorrelation existed. Therefore, by examining data from different countries, 
autocorrelation will not be a problem. 
Another possible revision of this model is to expand the sample size. While 
quarterly data from 1975 to 1991 is sufficient, it might be better to extend the data size 
to enhance the overall reliability of the findings. It would also help to determine if the 
findings still hold up and, thus, are not biased by the time period selected for this study. 
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Appendix I 
Heteroscedasticity occurs when the error terms do not have the same variance. 
If a model is found to suffer from heteroscedasticity, then the results from the least 
squares regression are questionable. For that reason, it is necessary to correct for it. 
The appropriate technique for rectifying the problem is to first run the regression as 
normal. The model will be as follows, 
(Al.1): INT= a+ P1 Y + ~2 TAX+ ~3 DEBT+ ~4 X + ~5 GOVT+ P6 M2 + e 
The SAS printout will also report the predicted value, or PREDY, for each observation. 
which results from this regression. Then heteroscedasticity can be corrected for by 
simply dividing each variable by the predicted value for each observation. In doing so, 
the intercept term is eliminated. The resulting model then appears as follows: 
(Al.2): INT/Z=a(I/Z)+~ 1(TAX/Z)+Pi{DEBT/Z)+~iDEBT/Z)+PlX/Z)+ 
p 5(GOVT/Z)+~iM2/Z)+u 
The error term, in this case denoted as u, will have a relatively constant variance 
(Newbold, p. 581). 
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Appendix 2 
Autocorrelation occurs in time series data where the error terms are correlated. 
It can be detected using the Durbin-Watson test statistic. If autocorrelation is present, 
then first-order autocorrelation can be corrected for (this was described in the text of 
the paper). If that still.does not work, higher-order autocorrelation is possibly present 
in the model. 
For time period t, a regression can be written as follows: 
(A2.l): yt =a.+ P1 X1,t + ... +~le ~t +Et 
Lagging this equation one period and multiplying it by p gives: 
(A2.2): P Y t.-1 = pa. + ~t PX1,t-1 + · · · + P1c PX1c.t..1 + P£t-1 
Similarly, lagging two periods and multiplying by p 2 yields: 
2 2 2 A 2 2 (A2.3): P Yt-2 = P a. + P1 P X1,t..2 + · · · + JJ1c P X1c,t..2 + P Et.-2 
pis the "correlation coefficient between adjacent errors." In running the regression, the 
error term, Et, can be depicted as follows (where ut denotes an error term which is not 
autocorrelated): 
(A2.4): Et= p2 E1r2 + p s1r1 + ut 
From this, it is possible to achieve an error term which is not autocorrelated by taking 
equation (A2.1) and subtracting from it (A2.2) and (A2.3). This then gives: 
(A2.5): Yt-p Y 1r1-P2Y 1r2 = (a.-pa.-p2a.) + <f31x1,t-f3i.Px1,1r1-l3i.P2X1.1r:J + · · · + (Et-PE1r1-P281r:J 
Which can be rewritten as: 
(A2.6): Yt-pYt;..l-p2Yt;..2 = a.(1-p-pl + ~1CX1,ti>X1,1r1-P2X1,1r:J + ... + (Et-PE1r1-P2Et;..i} 
Simply put, by taking each variable and subtracting from it the first lag times p and the 
second lag times p 2, then second-order autocorrelation can be corrected (Newbold, p. 
590). 
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Real Private Consumption and the Federal Budget Deficit 
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Real Private Corummption and Real GNP 
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"Marginal Tax Burden" (Marginal Tax Rate Plus FICA Tax Rate) 
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